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ABSTRACT 
According to the main element of the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) legal admissibility 
test set out in Regulation 211/2011, a proposed ECI cannot collect signatures of support if it 
‘manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for 
a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.’ This contribution 
argues that the interpretation and application ECI legal admissibility test have developed 
since the early years of the ECI’s operation, largely due to the CJEU’s intervention in ECI-
cases. It analyses the procedural and substantive changes to the test in light of the relevant 
litigation and the ongoing reform of the ECI’s legal framework. It illustrates that certain 
contested procedural aspects of the ECI legal admissibility test have been resolved, while the 
scope of the ECI has been extended to allow Initiatives in the field of international 
agreements. The article explores the effects of these developments on current and future ECI 
practice, including the possibility to bring an ECI in the context of the Brexit EU-UK 
negotiations.   
Keywords: Democratic Participation, Court of Justice of the European Union, International 
Agreements, TTIP, Brexit, European Commission 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) has faced numerous criticisms, not 
least due to its ‘legal admissibility test’, which is a prerequisite for a proposed Initiative to be 
registered as an ECI and start collecting signatures. The test exists mainly to filter out 
proposed Initiatives that are legally unattainable and thus cannot be acted upon even if they 
collect the necessary number of signatures. According to the only criterion of the test that has 
been used so far to reject proposed Initiatives, the Commission will not register an Initiative 
if the proposal ‘falls manifestly outside the scope of the Commission’s powers to submit a 
proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’.1 Overall, 
in the six years of the ECI’s life, the Commission has refused registration to 22 out of 48 
proposed Initiatives. The relatively high number of rejections led commentators, ECI 
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organisers, and civil society organisations to criticise, in the past, the Commission’s 
interpretation and application of Article 4(2)(b) of the legal admissibility test. 
Even the Commission itself has identified difficulties faced by citizens when trying to 
propose legally admissible initiatives, as stipulated in the recently published Commission’s 
Second Report on the ECI Regulation.2 When looking at the statistics in the Report, however, 
one thing, among others, strikes the attention of the reader: the decrease in the number of 
rejections to proposed Initiatives from 2012 until 2018. In the first three years of the ECI’s 
existence (2012-2015), the Commission rejected 20 Initiatives. Between 2015 and 2018, that 
number decreased to only two.3 The difference between the two numbers prompts an inquiry 
as to the reasons behind the decrease. Surely, one reason is that the number of requests for 
registration has also decreased since 2015, from 51 between 2012 and 2015, to merely 19 
between 2015 and 2018. An additional reason, however, may be that the ECI legal 
admissibility test itself has developed and changed in comparison to the first years of the 
ECI’s operation.  
This article seeks to explore the evolution of the ECI legal admissibility test. It argues that the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in ECI-related cases has played a primary 
role in the development of the test, not only by clarifying aspects of the test, but also by 
triggering certain changes to the Commission’s approach towards the registration of proposed 
Initiatives. In particular, the contribution identifies the evolution of the test by analysing the 
ECI-judgments delivered by the CJEU and exploring the impact of those judgments on the 
interpretation and application of the legal admissibility test by the Commission in recent 
registration decisions.  
The article argues that the evolution of the ECI’s legal admissibility test can be seen both in 
procedural and in substantive terms. With regard to procedure, the nature of the test has 
become more flexible by allowing inter alia the registration of only part of a proposed 
Initiative. This means that, contrary to the Commission’s initial approach, an Initiative 
putting forward multiple proposals can be registered even when not all its proposals are 
compliant with the Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. With regard to the substantive 
aspects of the test, the scope of application of the ECI has expanded in comparison to the 
early interpretation of the legal admissibility test by the Commission. It now includes 
proposals on the conclusion of international (trade) agreements, where direct citizens’ 
participation has traditionally been limited. The article explains how the CJEU judgments on 
the ECI-cases have led to these changes.  
Nevertheless, the discussion does not take at face value the changes to the ECI’s legal 
admissibility test. Instead, it contrasts the potential that is offered in principle by the 
developments to the ECI’s admissibility test, with the practical limitations of these 
developments, including those characterising the possibility to influence EU actions through 
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an ECI. In this sense, it identifies the effects of the ECI registration’s evolution on current 
and future ECI practice.  
The article begins with an overview of the relationship between the legal admissibility test 
and the ECI as a participatory mechanism (Section II). This should serve both as an aide-
memoire for those familiar with the ECI, and as an introduction to the topic for those who are 
not. It then analyses the evolution of the ECI legal admissibility test from two perspectives. 
Firstly, it discusses the impact of the CJEU’s ECI-judgments on certain procedural aspects of 
the ECI legal admissibility test (Section III). As will be seen, the CJEU has attempted to 
clarify aspects of the legal admissibility test, such as the duties of the Commission and the 
ECI organisers when reviewing and submitting ECIs respectively, and the possibility for 
partial registration of an ECI. The discussion identifies the potential implications of this body 
of litigation by explaining the impact of the relevant judgments on the Commission’s recent 
registration decisions, but also on the Commission’s Proposal for a New ECI Regulation, 
which attempts to codify some of the recent changes to the legal admissibility test.4  
Secondly, the article examines the impact of the CJEU judgments on the ECI’s substantive 
aspects. It argues that the developments arising from the case law in this regard (e.g. on the 
type of actions that citizens can propose through an ECI) lead to a positive extension of the 
ECI’s legal scope (Section IV). Going beyond an exploration of the case law as such, the 
article attempts to evaluate these advancements in the ECI’s registration process by 
considering examples of ECIs in practice, and reflecting on the possible future use of the ECI 
in the context of International Agreements, taking Brexit as an example at hand.  
Through the analysis of the procedural and substantive changes to the ECI legal admissibility 
test, the contribution aims to identify whether the ECI’s legal admissibility stage has changed 
to such an extent that it can strengthen the ECI as a mechanism for EU citizens to express 
their voice and request legislative or policy action in areas as contested as – for instance – the 
Brexit negotiations. By doing so, the analysis contributes to the current literature on the ECI, 
which is currently missing an overall assessment of the ECI’s admissibility test encompassing 
all the Court judgments and their influence on the Commission’s approach and the future of 
the ECI. In the early stages of the ECI, the legal admissibility test had attracted the attention 
of scholars who attempted to map the Commission’s approach to the registration of proposed 
Initiatives.5 Since then, academic commentary on the registration of the ECI has focused 
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largely on individual ECI-cases or on a discussion of the judgments delivered by the General 
Court vis-à-vis the objectives of the ECI.6  
Against this background, the current article aims to provide a more in-depth, and up-to-date 
exploration of a particular aspect of the ECI, namely the application of Article 4(2)(b). 
Moreover, it aims to become a point for reflection on the future of the ECI and particularly on 
the Commission’s new proposals relating to the ECI admissibility test, which has not 
attracted the attention of the literature so far. In this way, the article constitutes a timely and 
original analysis of the ECI legal admissibility test, which considers all the relevant CJEU 
case law, and updates previous research on the subject. 
Ultimately, this contribution calls for a nuanced response to the evolution of the ECI’s legal 
admissibility test (Section V). It argues that the well-known shortcomings of the ECI as a 
means to influence legislative action at the EU level, as well as the risk of an overly-
formalised codification of recent changes, call for caution when painting an overly rosy 
picture of the ECI’s registration stage in comparison with past practice. Potential ECI 
organisers, ECI stakeholders, and those simply interested in new channels of political 
participation in the EU, might wish to consider this message when forming their opinion on 
the nature and potential of the ECI as a mechanism for democratic participation. 
 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY TEST TO THE ECI AS A 
PARTICIPATORY MECHANISM 
For readers unfamiliar with the topic, the ECI is a participatory mechanism introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. It allows EU citizens to request the Commission to consider an idea as a 
possible basis for a legislative proposal. It has been in existence since 2012, and its legal 
framework consists of Article 11(4) TEU, 24 TFEU, and Regulation 211/2011 (the ECI 
Regulation), which sets out a detailed procedure for bringing an ECI. The organisers of an 
ECI have one year to collect one million signatures from seven EU Member States supporting 
their idea in order for it to be considered by the Commission, which ultimately has the 
discretion as to how to respond.7 Since 2012, 48 ECI campaigns took place, on topics ranging 
from the environment and education to migration and the eurozone crisis.8 Out of those, four  
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managed to reach the one million signatures, with questionable results as to their effect in 
triggering actual legislative or policy change at the EU level.9 
In its few years of life, the ECI Regulation has been subject to extensive criticism for being 
overly burdensome and non-user-friendly. Voices of dissatisfaction coming, among others, 
from the European Parliament and from civil society organisations, led to a process of review 
of the instrument by the Commission which has been ongoing since 2015.10 In September 
2017, the Commission published a proposal for a New ECI Regulation (hereinafter ‘New ECI 
Regulation Proposal’) after the publication of its own studies and a round of public 
consultation.11 According to the Commission, the amendments that need to be made in the 
ECI’s legal framework are so substantial and fundamental that mandate the repeal and 
replacement of the existing ECI Regulation ‘in the interest of clarity for citizens and 
organisers’.12 The New ECI Regulation Proposal has passed by the hands of the European 
Parliament, and specifically the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) which tabled 
its Draft Report in March 2018. The Report was voted in plenary in July 2018 and will 
formulate the basis for the first round of negotiations with the Council.13 The inclusion of the 
ECI’s revision process in the Joint Declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2018-
2019 indicates that the revision is on course to be completed before the 2019 European 
Parliament elections.14 This article returns to the New ECI Regulation Proposal later on, to 
evaluate the proposed modifications to the ECI legal admissibility test. For now, the 
subsequent analysis focuses on the operation of the ECI under the current legal framework.  
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One of the main criticisms of the ECI is that it imposes a strict legal admissibility test for 
those wishing to register with the Commission a proposal for an Initiative.15 In order to 
submit a proposed Initiative with the Commission for registration, the organisers are required 
to provide the title, subject matter, and objectives of the proposed ECI, to stipulate the Treaty 
provisions they consider relevant for their proposal, and to give some personal details of 
themselves and all of the sources of funding for the ECI at the time of registration.16 The 
organisers can also provide an Annex to their registration form with additional information 
on the subject, objectives, and background to the proposed ECI, and a draft act, if they wish 
to do so. 
Upon receiving the above information, the Commission then goes on to check whether the 
ECI’s citizens’ committee is formed and designed in accordance with the ECI Regulation17, 
and if the proposed Initiative complies with the so-called ‘legal admissibility test’ which 
consists of three criteria. In particular an Initiative will not be registered if it ‘manifestly falls 
outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the 
Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’18, if it is ‘manifestly abusive, frivolous 
or vexatious’19 or ‘manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 
TEU’.20 If the Commission refuses to register an ECI, it is obliged under Article 4(3) of the 
ECI Regulation to inform the organisers of the reasons for such refusal and the channels 
through which the Commission’s decision can be challenged.21 
The interpretation and application of the ECI’s legal admissibility test by the Commission 
have been the subject of analysis and discussion from the very early stages of the ECI 
Regulation and well into the first few years of the ECI’s operation. ECI stakeholders, as well 
as academics, have often argued that the test is an obstacle to the effectiveness of the ECI as a 
participatory instrument. For instance, the Commission has been criticised for applying the 
Article 4(2)(b) test in an overly-legalistic manner which limits the ability of citizens to 
influence the EU legislative agenda.22 Civil society has been advocating for reforms to ensure 
‘the broadest possible’ definition of the ECI’s scope23, and even the Commission itself has 
expressed the view that ‘the registration phase remains one of the main challenges in the 
implementation of the ECI instrument.’24  
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Organisers of rejected ECIs have expressed doubts as to the willingness of the Commission to 
encourage the use of ECIs,25 while six of them chose to challenge the Commission’s 
rejections before the CJEU. The General Court has delivered a judgment in all of these cases, 
which concerned Commission Decisions to reject initiatives between 2012 and 2014. 26 Three 
of the cases were appealed, giving the opportunity to the ECJ in the case of Anagnostakis to 
look into the ECI’s legal framework for the first time since it was laid down the Treaty of 
Lisbon.27 The General Court has also recently delivered its judgment in the case of One of 
Us, which is not directly related to the legal admissibility stage of the ECI but instead 
concerns the Commission’s discretion at the final stages of an ECI. Taken together, the 
judgments create an entirely new body of litigation vis-à-vis citizens’ participation at the EU 
level and clarify certain aspects of the ECI Regulation on which organisers and the 
Commission did not see eye to eye. This holds true notwithstanding that the CJEU found for 
the Commission in all but two of the cases. 
Against this background, the subsequent analysis (Section III) focuses on recent clarifications 
and changes to the legal admissibility test, which have resulted both from the above-
mentioned litigation challenging the Commission’s refusal to register proposed Initiatives, 
and from consequent modifications to the Commission’s own approach to reviewing 
Initiative proposals. It will be argued that the CJEU has shed light on certain procedural 
aspects of the ECI’s legal admissibility test which were, until now, debatable. It will also be 
shown that the CJEU’s judgments have had an impact on the Commission’s approach even 
where the CJEU did not rule precisely on a particular issue (esp. the partial registration of 
ECIs).  
The discussion on the procedural aspects of the registration process will be followed by an 
exploration of the substantive changes that have resulted from the CJEU judgments (Section 
IV).  Put together, the developments to the ECI, which have resulted from the contribution of 
the CJEU to procedural and substantive elements of the ECI’s registration stage, illustrate 
how the ECI legal admissibility test has evolved since the initial stages of the ECI’s life. In 
principle, this evolution should have positive effects to the registration of proposed ECIs, and 
                                                          
25
 See B Constantini, ‘Reply to the Ombudsman’s own Inquiry on the ECI’, available at 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/53306/html.bookmark> and A Karatzia (n 5). 
26
 See Efler and Others v Commission, T-754/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:323 (hereinafter Efler); Costantini and 
Others v Commission, T-44/14, ECLI:EU:T:2016:223 (hereinafter Constantini); Minority SafePack v 
Commission, T-646/13, ECLI:EU:T:2017:59 (hereinafter Minority SafePack); Anagnostakis v Commission, T-
450/12, ECLI:EU:T:2015:739 (appealed in Anagnostakis v Commission, C-589/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:663) 
(hereinafter Anagnostakis); HB and Others v Commission, T-361/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:252 (appealed in HB and 
Others v Commission, C-336/17 P, ECLI:EU:C:2018:74); Izsák and Dabis v Commission, T-529/13, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:282 (hereinafter Izsák and Dabis, an pending judgment on appeal in Izsák and Dabis v 
Commission C-420/16 P).  It is also worth mentioning the case of Hungary v Commission, Case T50/16, which 
was a challenge by a Member State against the Commission for the registration of an Initiative proposing the 
enforcement of the rule of law in the EU. The case was withdrawn. It should also be noted from the outside that 
this contribution will not deal with the assessment by the CJEU of the actual legal bases suggested by 
organisers, i.e. on whether the Commission rightly or wrongly decided that a Treaty provision is not suitable as 
a legal basis for a specific Initiative.  
27
 These are the Anagnostakis, HB and Others v Commission, and Izsák and Dabis cases. 
8 
 
particularly to the width of the substance of proposals that can be registered by the 
Commission. Whether these positive effects are reflected, or can be reflected, in practice is 
discussed throughout the analysis. 
 
III. CLARIFYING PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE ECI’S  
REGISTRATION STAGE 
The judgments of the CJEU on the cases challenging the Commission’s decisions to reject 
proposed Initiatives allow us to identify the contribution of this stream of litigation to the 
development of the ECI.28 It would be an exaggeration to say that the CJEU’s case law has 
been transformative for all the applicants. In fact, as mentioned above, the Court ruled in 
favour of ECI organisers in only two out of the six cases.29 In the remaining four cases, the 
Court ruled that the Commission applied the legal test correctly, both from a procedural (i.e. 
based on the reasons given by the Commission) and a substantive point of view (i.e. based on 
the Commission’s assessment of the proposed Initiative’s subject matter vis-à-vis Article 
4(2)(b)). 
Yet, even in the cases where the applicants failed, the CJEU has clarified certain procedural 
aspects relating to the interpretation of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. This section 
distils the main findings of the CJEU with regard to three core procedural elements of the 
test: the responsibilities of the Commission and the responsibilities of the organisers during 
the registration phase, as well as the possibility to allow an Initiative to be partly registered.  
It illustrates the effects of the judgments on the practice of the Commission so far, and takes a 
step forward by considering the implications of the codification of partial registration in the 
Commission’s New Proposed ECI Regulation. 
A. The responsibilities of the Commission and the ECI organisers  
A number of the cases before the CJEU had challenged the Commission’s decisions on 
procedural grounds, arguing that the Commission had breached its duty to give reasons by 
inadequately justifying its rejections, or had misinterpreted the ECI Regulation by prohibiting 
the partial registration of proposed Initiatives. Consequently, some of the ECI-judgments 
dealt with the tasks of the Commission during the process of registering an ECI. For example, 
the ECJ in the appeal of the first ECI-case, namely Anagnostakis v Commission, analysed the 
Commission’s tasks at the legal admissibility test both vis-a-vis Article 4 of the ECI 
Regulation, and in light of the principle of good administration.30 In this regard, the 
Commission is bound ‘to conduct a diligent and impartial examination’ of each proposed 
Initiative, which should take into consideration all the relevant features of the proposal.31 The 
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ECJ spoke of a ‘duty’ bestowed on the Commission ‘to provide assistance and advice to the 
organisers of an ECI, in particular with regard to the registration criteria’.32  
While the ECJ referred to Recital 4 and Article 4(1) of the ECI Regulation as the foundations 
of the Commission’s duty, a closer look into these provisions shows a more nuanced image of 
the Commission’s role than that of having a ‘duty to assist’. Recital 4 states that the 
Commission shall provide citizens with information and advice ‘upon request’ and Article 
4(1) requires the Commission to provide information and assistance ‘through a point of 
contact’. The Commission considers that it has fulfilled this duty by assisting interested 
citizens through the ‘Europe Direct’ centres and via technical support at the signature 
collection stage.33 Nevertheless, the language of the ECJ in Anagnostakis points to a stricter 
duty governing the Commission’s activities at the registration stage with the purpose of 
ensuring easy accessibility to the ECI.34  
Provided that the Commission acts upon this stricter duty to help potential organisers at the 
registration duty, the ECJ’s proclamation on this aspect of the ECI’s registration stage is good 
news for future ECI organisers. In fact, it tackles one of the main areas in need of 
improvement that were identified in the 2017 public consultation on the ECI viz. the need to 
provide enhanced advice and support to organisers regarding registration requirements.35 
Rather independently from the judgment as such, there are already signs by the Commission 
of attempting to improve this element of the ECI. For instance, the Commission has procured 
the creation of a collaborative platform, where former ECI organisers are meant to interact 
with potential ECI organisers in order to provide advice and support. The collaborative 
platform is currently at a pilot stage but the Commission has recommended turning it into a 
permanent tool offering advice by including it in the Proposed New ECI Regulation.36 
An additional development resulting from the ECI cases relates to the duty of the 
Commission to look at all the information provided by ECI organisers before concluding its 
assessment of a proposed Initiative. This point was one of the issues of disagreement between 
the Commission and ECI organisers in the cases of Iszak and Dabis and Minority SafePack. 
In the latter case, the organisers contested the lack of an explanation by the Commission as to 
which of the eleven acts proposed by their Initiative failed to comply with Article 4(2)(b) of 
the ECI Regulation and as to why this was so. They argued that the Commission infringed 
Article 296(2) TFEU (i.e. the obligation of EU institutions to state the reasons behind their 
legal acts) and Article 4(3) of the ECI Regulation, which states that the Commission shall 
inform the ECI organisers of the reasons for the refusal of their Initiative.37  
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In contrast, the Commission’s position was that its decision stated the main reasons for 
refusing the registration thus addressing the issues with the subject matter of the ECI as that 
was expressed by the ECI organisers in the registration form submitted to the Commission. 
Any additional information provided by the organisers to the Commission at the registration 
stage was only indicative and informative, and could not be seen as expanding or limiting the 
subject matter of the proposal.38  
Dismissing the Commission’s argument, the General Court in Minority Safepack reiterated its 
ruling in Iszak and Dabis that the Commission should have considered the information 
provided in the organisers’ Annex as being equally important to the mandatory information 
required by Annex II of the ECI Regulation. Annex II of the ECI Regulation gives the 
possibility to the organisers to submit to the Commission additional information about their 
proposal, and has the same binding force as the ECI Regulation. Hence, the Commission has 
a duty, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, to consider all additional 
information in the same way as it considers the mandatory information required by Annex 
II.39 
Although these findings of the Court may come across as trivialities or as minor details in the 
grand scheme of things, they shape the extend of the Commission’s duty to give reasons for 
rejecting an ECI. The expansion of the list of sources that should be taken into account at the 
registration stage implies an expanded legal duty to provide reasons for rejecting an ECI. 
According to the CJEU, the Commission’s replies must include the reasons behind the refusal 
of an ECI in light of all the information submitted by the ECI organisers, and not just based 
on the subject matter stated in the registration form.40 This is a beneficial development not 
only for the clarity of the reasons behind the rejection of specific ECIs, but also because it 
acknowledges the organisers’ efforts to put together a legally sound Initiative proposal. 
Beyond the specific issues with the Annexes of a proposed Initiative, the case law also sheds 
light on the Commission’s duty to give reasons more generally speaking. In this regard, the 
CJEU followed a line of thought consistent with the case law on the EU institutions’ duty to 
give reasons under Article 296 TFEU. In the cases challenging the Commission’s reasons for 
the refusal to register an ECI, the CJEU repeated the established line of case law on the EU 
Institutions’ obligation to give reasons: the reasoning must allow the persons concerned to 
ascertain the reasons behind the measure, and should enable the competent Court to review 
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the Institution’s decision.41 At the same time, the reasons must be assessed with regard not 
only to the wording of the decision, but also taking into consideration the context of the case 
and the applicable legal rules.42  
It is notable that in the ECI cases the Court did not deviate from the case law on Article 296 
TFEU. It could be argued that, since these cases were the first ones concerning the ECI, the 
Court had some space to shape the Commission’s duty to give reasons more closely in line 
with the ECI’s objectives, as those are stipulated in primary (Article 11(4) TEU) and 
secondary (the ECI Regulation) EU law. For instance, the ECI’s anchoring in the Treaty’s 
provisions on democratic principles (Articles 9-12 TEU) could have called for a more open 
line of communication between citizens who wish to bring an ECI and the Commission than 
in other situations involving exchanges between citizens and EU Institutions.  
The above comment is not meant to criticise the CJEU’s approach to the issue per se. It is 
rather to question whether a modified duty to give reasons would not have accommodated 
also considerations relating to the inexperience with EU law of lay citizens who wish to bring 
an ECI. As will be discussed below, the CJEU did not consider the level of knowledge or 
experience of ECI organisers as an element that must be taken into account by the 
Commission during the examination of an Initiative’s legal admissibility.43 In other words, 
the argument that most of the potential ECI organisers are lay citizens without EU law 
expertise cannot affect the strictly legal assessment that takes place during the legal 
admissibility test. With this consideration in mind, it can be argued that a stricter duty to give 
reasons would have been an alternative way to incorporate a particularity of the ECI in the 
relevant case law on the duty to give reasons. 
The approach of the CJEU to assessing the reasoning of the Commission has also delineated 
the ECI organisers’ duties at the legal admissibility stage. It has become evident from the ECI 
case law that the Commission is not the only actor with responsibilities at the registration 
stage. Instead, organisers also have responsibilities when providing the Commission with 
information at the registration stage. For example, regarding an Initiative proposing action on 
the basis of Article 352 TFEU, the General Court indicated that potential ECI organisers 
should not be criticised if they have not managed to establish the necessity of the act they are 
proposing. That assessment is, in any case, something that should take place after the 
registration of the ECI, even though it constitutes part and parcel of the competence 
stipulated in Article 352 TFEU.44 The organisers should still demonstrate, however, that their 
proposal intends to attain a Treaty objective, which will allow the Commission to assess their 
request to use Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis.45  
Along the same lines, organisers who only make general references to Treaty provisions 
without explaining the connection between the provisions and their ECI proposal should not 
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expect from the Commission a fully detailed analysis of all the various Treaty provisions 
generally mentioned in the ECI proposal, and of why these could not be the basis for 
registration.46 Instead, the Commission is entitled to take a decision only based on the Treaty 
provision that was the least irrelevant to the objective of the proposed Initiative.47 Hence, in 
these situations, organisers should have limited expectations as to the reasons given by the 
Commission for the refusal of their ECI. 
In principle, the above developments to the ECI’s legal admissibility test have left us with a 
more flexible and user-friendly procedure for the registration of an Initiative than the initial 
stages of the ECI Regulation. In practice, the Commission has started publishing more 
detailed Decisions on the registration or refusal of every ECI that is submitted for registration 
instead of only sending a letter to organisers of Initiatives that were refused registration. This 
shift in the Commission’s behaviour can be perhaps indirectly linked with the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on the extent of the Commission’s duty to give reasons in the context of an 
ECI.  It is also worth mentioning that the new Decisions on registered ECIs include a 
provision where the Commission explains its own understanding of the Initiative that it 
registers. This was not the case before. It used to be the case that an Initiative was simply 
registered, and its subject matter and objectives were fully discussed at the follow-up stage.48 
The discussion so far has outlined the way in which the CJEU has clarified certain matters of 
contention between the organisers and the Commission regarding the application of the ECI 
legal admissibility test, and particularly the responsibilities of actors involved in the 
registration process. In what follows, we turn to the contribution of the CJEU to a third 
procedural aspect of the test, namely the possibility to partially register an ECI in cases where 
not all of the Initiative’s objectives are fully compliant with the legal admissibility test. 
B. Partial Registration of an ECI 
The issue of whether the Commission can allow for the partial registration of an ECI was put 
before the General Court in the case of Minority Safepack. One of the grounds for review put 
forward by the applicants in the case was that the Commission infringed the procedural 
requirement to give reasons, inter alia because it failed to explain its position that the ECI 
Regulation does not allow for the registration of at least a part or parts of a proposed ECI. 
According to the letter sent to the organisers of Minority Safepack, some of the acts requested 
in the Annex to the ECI could fall within the framework of the Commission’s powers, but the 
ECI Regulation prevented the registration of a part or parts of a proposed Initiative. This 
specification was not explicitly stated in the ECI Regulation and thus was criticised as 
needlessly restricting the scope of the proposed Initiatives and limiting the possibility for 
ECIs to generate public debate.49 The Commission’s counter-argument in the case was that it 
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was not obliged to explain the reasons behind its position that Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI 
Regulation does not allow partial registration of an ECI.50 
Notably, the General Court did not rule on the point of partial registration. It merely found 
that the Commission’s reasoning in the case was inadequate. The lack of sufficient reasoning 
impeded the organisers from re-submitting a new ECI proposal, as they did not have enough 
information about the types of acts that would have been accepted by the Commission. It also 
prevented the General Court from assessing the legality of the Commission’s response. At a 
more general level, the lack of a complete statement of reasons discouraged citizens’ 
participation in democratic life and contradicted the objective of the ECI to make the EU 
more accessible to citizens.51 The General Court therefore did not examine whether the 
Commission’s interpretation of the ECI Regulation, which was not specified anywhere in the 
ECI legal framework, was legally sound. In the Court’s view, it was unnecessary to rule on 
this question because the Commission had anyway failed to comply with its obligation to 
state reasons. 
Despite the silence of the General Court on the matter of partial registration of an ECI, the 
judgment has led to a change to the subsequent approach of the Commission.52 After the 
General Court’s judgment, the Commission made a 180-degree turn and started registering 
only parts of proposed ECIs that would otherwise have been rejected altogether. The first 
example of this change in practice is the Minority SafePack Initiative itself. Following the 
judgment, the Commission issued a new Decision on the same, initial proposal. The Decision 
sets out the eleven acts that were proposed by the Initiative’s organisers, followed by a 
description of some (generic) areas in which legal acts can be adopted by the EU, which is 
meant to explain the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for an ECI 
in accordance with Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation.53 In turn, the Decision specifies 
which two proposals (out of the eleven proposals of the Initiative) do not satisfy Article 
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4(2)(b). As a result, the Commission registers only the remaining nine proposals of ‘Minority 
SafePack’. According to the Decision, signatures supporting the Minority SafePack Initiative 
should be collected only to the extent that the said ECI aims at proposals from the 
Commission regarding the nine admissible parts of the ECI.54 
Allowing the partial registration of ECIs is a positive development to the ECI’s legal 
admissibility test, and to the ECI’s future development. It allows for an increase in the pool of 
future ECIs, as Initiatives will no longer be rejected on this ground. The potential of this 
change to the test is evidenced by the Minority SafePack ECI itself: the ECI organisers 
recently announced that they have reached the necessary one million signatures, meaning that 
their ECI will most probably proceed to the so-called ‘follow-up stage’.55 Had the 
Commission followed its initial approach, which precluded partial registration of an ECI, 
‘Minority SafePack’ would have remained in the list of the proposals that were rejected 
registration. It seems, however, that the Commission has not only changed its current practice 
based on the CJEU’s judgment. A look at the Proposed New ECI Regulation indicates that 
the Commission acknowledges the advantages of partial registration, by proposing its 
codification. 
 
C. Looking forward: Partial registration under the Proposed New ECI Regulation 
Article 6 of the Proposed New ECI Regulation features a slightly modified ECI admissibility 
test than the current one, which repeats the basics of the current procedure: organisers can 
start collecting signatures supporting their ECI after they have submitted their request 
through the register and the Commission has checked that the proposal satisfies certain legal 
and procedural criteria and has registered the proposal.56 Article 6(3)(d) and (e) preserve two 
of the legal criteria of the current ECI Regulation: a proposed Initiative will not be registered 
if it is manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or if it is manifestly contrary to the values 
of the EU.57  
 
The most prominent changes in comparison with the current Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI 
Regulation are included in Articles 6(3)(c) and Article 6(4) of the New ECI Regulation. 
Article 6(3)(c) states that the Commission shall register a proposed initiative if ‘none of the 
parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. 
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 6(4), which allows for the partial 
registration of an ECI by the Commission. The attempt to formalise partial registration is 
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laudable from the point of legal certainty, although perhaps also unnecessary: there is nothing 
in the current ECI Regulation to prohibit the partial registration of an Initiative. 
 
It can be argued that the current proposal for the New ECI Regulation, as described above, 
risks overcomplicating the registration process. The revised procedure consists of a back-and-
forth exchange of proposals between the Commission and the ECI organisers. If the 
Commission considers that only parts of a proposal fall within its competences to propose a 
legal act, it will send the proposal back to the organisers within one month, together with the 
reasons behind its assessment. It then becomes the responsibility of the organisers to change 
and resubmit, to maintain, or to withdraw their initial proposal.58 If the organisers decide to 
modify their proposal, they become responsible for submitting the necessary amendments to 
the Commission within one month. After receiving the amendments, the Commission has one 
month to assess the new information and to register, partially register, or reject the ECI.59 
From a substantive point of view, the Commission would have to check if ‘a substantial part 
of the initiative, including its main objectives’ does not manifestly fall outside the framework 
of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act. The proposed Regulation, 
however, does not clarify what is a ‘substantial part’ of a proposed Initiative: does it mean the 
most important proposals, more than half of the proposals, or simply ‘the gist’ of an 
Initiative? Does it formalise the Commission’s current approach to partial registrations or 
does it signal a new way to tackle this issue? The lack of a clear explanation of what is a 
‘substantial part of the initiative’ risks complicating the process and leading to disagreements 
between the Commission and organisers.  
The Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposed New ECI Regulation 
rightly suggests a less complicated terminology.60 It recommends that the Commission should 
simply ‘partially register the initiative if part of the initiative does not manifestly fall outside 
the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union 
for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ (Article 6(4)).61 It also suggests to extend by 
one month the timeframe for the organisers to amend their Initiative after the initial 
assessment of the Commission, and to give further details about the obligation of the 
Commission to give reasons for the way it handles a proposed Initiative.62 It is to be hoped 
that the European Parliament’s proposed amendments will prevail in the shaping of the New 
ECI Regulation, in order to prevent the risks of further complicating the registration process. 
 
IV. ON SUBSTANCE: THE NATURE OF THE TEST AND THE SCOPE OF THE 
EUROPEAN CITIZENS’ INITIATIVE 
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In addition to the generic and procedural clarifications discussed above, the case law of the 
CJEU has also contributed to the development of the ECI from a substantive point of view. In 
this sense, the CJEU has clarified questions about the type of legal assessment that needs to 
take place under the said provision. Moreover, it has contributed to the delineation of the 
scope of the European Citizens’ Initiative by ruling on the possibility to use Article 352 
TFEU as a legal basis, and the use of the ECI to influence international agreements. As we 
will see, these developments have not only answered questions on specific contested refusals 
to register ECIs, but have also extended the legal scope of the ECI as a participatory 
instrument. 
A.The nature of the legal admissibility test 
One of the most contested substantive aspects of the ECI’s legal admissibility test was the 
interpretation of the term ‘manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to 
propose a legal act’ which is stipulated in Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. Some 
academic commentators had defended the view that the criterion of ‘manifestly outside’ 
should relate to the flexibility of the Commission towards the application of the ECI legal 
admissibility test.63 In this sense, it was argued that proposed Initiatives should be refused 
registration only when their objectives clearly could not be achieved through the available 
legal bases.64 Others argued that the wording of Article 4(2)(b) suggested that the test did not 
require final legal conclusions; those should be taken only at the end of the process, after the 
public hearing of an ECI.65 Instead, the ECI legal admissibility test should encompass only a 
preliminary legal assessment of a proposed Initiative. 
By way of contrast, the Commission’s view was that the legal review carried out during the 
legal admissibility stage ‘cannot be rough but must, on the contrary, be full in order to 
prevent the procedure from progressing’66 if the Commission cannot propose the adoption of 
an act because of its lack of competence. Furthermore, the Commission maintained the 
position that the registration of a proposed Initiative depends on the type of considerations 
that should be examined before deciding upon the existence of a competence to propose a 
legal act. Accordingly, a proposed Initiative would be inadmissible on the basis of Article 
4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation if ‘none of the provisions of the Treaties which provide for the 
adoption of legal acts on the basis of a proposal from the Commission can serve as the legal 
basis for an act covering the subject matter of the proposed ECI. Such a situation is manifest 
where that conclusion does not depend on factual circumstances.’67  
In the case of Constantini, the General Court touched upon the nature of the test and the level 
of legal analysis that the Commission should conduct during the legal admissibility stage. 
Disagreeing with the position of the Commission, the General Court sided with the 
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applicants: the wording of Article 4(2)(b) requires the Commission to carry out an initial 
examination of the information that it has in front of it. A more comprehensive examination 
should only be carried out if the proposal is registered, and should be published at the follow-
up stage.68 For the purposes of the legal admissibility test, the Commission only has to 
establish whether ‘in relation to a proposed ECI, it is manifest that it will be unable to make a 
proposal for a legal act founded on that provision’ (e.g. on Article 352 TFEU).69 
Along similar lines, the case of Iszak and Dabis70, which was decided one month after 
Constantini, states that Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation requires ‘an initial assessment 
[by the Commission] of the information at its disposal in order to determine whether the 
proposal in dispute does not manifestly fall outside the framework of its powers.’ A more 
exhaustive assessment is required under Article 10(1)(c) of the ECI Regulation.71 The case, 
therefore, confirms that the test under Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation is whether ‘the 
Commission was manifestly not entitled to propose the adoption of an act of the Union based 
on the articles of the Treaties, in particular those cited by the applicants in the proposal.’72 
The ECJ has confirmed this interpretation in the case of Anagnostakis v Commission, which 
was the first ECI-case to reach the ECJ (on appeal).73 
It is apparent from the case law that the CJEU has maintained a relatively sympathetic 
approach towards citizens wishing to submit an ECI proposal by acknowledging the 
preliminary character of the legal assessment under Article 4(2)(b). As a result, in principle, 
the Commission is left with less of a leeway to reject an ECI on the grounds of legal 
admissibility. Even so, the case law provides scant further insight as to the exact format or the 
precise meaning of the word ‘manifestly’ under Article 4(2)(b), or as to the flexibility of the 
Commission when applying the test. One aspect which it does clarify is whether the 
Commission should take into consideration the status of ECI organisers who have submitted 
proposals, and the fact that these citizens might be unaware of the specifics of EU law. In 
their view, the Commission should conduct a light review at the stage of registration, merely 
to ascertain whether the proposed ECI is a matter on which citizens can exchange views with 
the EU institutions.74  
The General Court did not examine the arguments concerning the background of the 
organisers or their capacity to put together a legally sound proposal. Instead, it observed that 
the aim of the ECI mechanism is not to initiate ‘a mere dialogue between the citizens and the 
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institutions’, but to request the Commission to submit a proposal for a legal act.75 Hence, the 
legal admissibility test of Article 4(2)(b) is, above all, grounded in legal considerations based 
on the principles of conferral (Article 5 TEU) and institutional balance (Article 13(2) TEU).76  
These are the yardsticks that should be used to interpret Article 4(2)(b), as opposed to an 
interpretation that takes into account the background of the Initiative organisers or their 
familiarity with EU law.  
B. The legal scope of the ECI 
As seen above, according to the Commission’s interpretation of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI 
Regulation the inadmissibility of an ECI is manifest when the Commission has to assess non-
factual circumstances to decide whether there is or not a Treaty provision allowing for a legal 
act on the subject matter of the proposed Initiative.77 Based on this interpretation, one might 
argue that the Commission should refuse the registration of a proposed Initiative if the 
suitability of a legal basis for registration depended on considerations that were not factual. 
For instance, the use of Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis could be problematic insofar as the 
use of that Treaty provision as a legal basis does not depend solely on factual circumstances, 
but rather requires an assessment of the necessity of the proposed measure. The provision 
gives the power to the Council, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, to 
adopt measures to attain one of the Treaty objectives if the Treaties have not provided the 
necessary powers (i.e. a lex specialis) and ‘if action by the Union should prove necessary’. 
An assessment of this kind would probably entail political considerations by the EU 
institutions, which are not supposed to take place at the ECI legal admissibility stage.78 
The General Court was given the opportunity to rule on the above point in the case of 
Constantini, where it was asked by the applicants to ascertain that Article 352 TFEU can 
constitute a legal basis for the registration of an ECI. The applicants argued that the 
Commission should have used Article 352 TFEU as the legal basis to register their (rejected) 
‘Right to Lifelong Healthcare Initiative.’79 Moreover, they contended that citizens should not 
be obliged to show in their ECI proposals specifically how the adoption of a legal act would 
be necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaties. In their view, such a requirement would 
be contrary to the spirit of the ECI Regulation. 
By virtue of the judgment, it is now clear that that ‘neither Article 352 TFEU nor Regulation 
211/2011 precludes recourse to Article 352 TFEU in the context of ECIs.’80 According to the 
General Court, the conditions for recourse to Article 352 TFEU would still need to be 
satisfied at the point of registration, but the assessment of the necessity of a legal act should 
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only take place after registration. The conclusions of this assessment should be published by 
the Commission at the follow-up stage, which is the final stage of a successfully submitted 
ECI. 
It is worth noting that the Commission never stated that Article 352 TFEU cannot be used as 
a legal basis for the registration of an ECI. The Commission mentioned the Article only once, 
in its reply to the proposed ‘Abolish Bullfighting Initiative’, which proposed the prohibition 
of bullfighting in the EU.81 According to the Commission’s statement, Article 352 TFEU was 
inadequate as a legal basis because of the objectives of the Initiative. The issue, therefore, 
seemed to be with the proposal itself, and not with using Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis.  
Nevertheless, the General Court approached the question of Article 352 TFEU essentially by 
making a distinction between the legal and political considerations that must be taken into 
account in the ECI’s lifecycle. The judgment sends the message that legal considerations 
regarding the competence to act on a proposed ECI should be separated from political 
considerations, such as the necessity of a proposal. The Court’s approach is noteworthy when 
compares to the Treaty text, which neither distinguishes the two aspects of Article 352 TFEU, 
nor specified that necessity is a political decision as opposed to the (legal) decision of 
whether to use Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis. In this way, the Court seems to prefer an 
expanded interpretation of the ECI’s scope, but also one that is in line with the ECI 
Regulation’s underlying idea that, when it comes to the ECI, ‘the legal’ should be separated 
from ‘the political’.  
In 2017, the General Court further clarified the legal scope of the ECI in the Stop TTIP case. 
In fact, from a substantive point of view it is the latter case that has led to one of the most 
significant developments to the ECI admissibility test, by tackling the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘legal acts for the implementation of the Treaties’ for the purposes of registering an 
ECI. The Stop TTIP is the second case where the General Court annulled a Commission’s 
Decision refusing registration of an ECI, and the first where it annulled a Commission’s 
Decision on the substantive ground that the refusal to register the Initiative breached Article 
11(4) TEU and Articles 2(1) and 4(2)(b) of the ECI.82 The essence of the issue in the case 
was whether limitations imposed by the Commission to the legal scope of the ECI were 
compatible with the applicable legal framework. These limitations were not explicitly set out 
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in the ECI Regulation, but had derived from the Commission’s interpretation of the ECI legal 
admissibility test.  
The specific case before the General Court concerned an Initiative proposal to stop the TTIP 
and CETA agreements.83 At the time of the Initiative’s proposal, the two agreements were at 
the forefront of the EU’s actions in the field of external relations. In more detail, the proposed 
‘Stop TTIP’ Initiative had invited the Commission to ask the Council to repeal its decision to 
authorise the opening of the TTIP negotiations under Article 218(2) TFEU. It also asked the 
Commission to submit a proposal for a Council decision not to conclude CETA. In 
September 2014, the Commission replied to the organisers that both their proposals had been 
rejected based on Article 4(2)(b) in conjunction with Article 2(1) of the ECI Regulation, 
because they fell outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for 
a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.  
The reply to the organisers had revealed two limitations to the scope of the ECI.84 The first 
limitation imposed by the Commission was that an ECI could not invite the Commission to 
adopt preparatory acts that produce legal effects only between the EU and its Member States 
and between EU institutions. The Commission argued that its proposals to the Council under 
Article 218 TFEU to authorise the opening of negotiations for international agreements were 
not proposals for legal acts. Instead, the Council Decisions authorising the opening of 
negotiations for an international agreement are preparatory acts that produce legal effects 
only between the EU and its Member States and between the EU institutions. As a result, the 
Commission’s relevant proposals to the Council lacked legal effect against third parties. In 
this sense, the position of the Commission was that ‘Stop TTIP’ was not proposing any legal 
acts for the purpose of implementing the Treaties and could not be registered. 
The second limitation declared by the Commission was that an ECI could not invite the 
Commission to propose a decision not to adopt a legal act, such as a proposal not to conclude 
an international agreement, or to refrain from proposing a legal act for the conclusion of an 
international agreement to the Council. This proposal would lack any autonomous legal effect 
beyond the fact that the legal act in question would not be adopted.  
The General Court widened the scope of the ECI by completely overruling the more limited 
Commission’s interpretation of legal admissibility regarding proposals for the conclusion of 
international agreements under Article 218 TFEU. Perhaps the significance of this 
development was not so pronounced in the specific case at hand. The Court had already 
found that the concerned action in question (i.e. the decision to withdraw authorisation to 
open negotiations with a view to concluding the TTIP) was, in fact, not a preparatory act, but 
a definitive act, as it brings the said negotiations to an end.85 Moreover, the actions proposed 
by the Initiative fit neatly into the definition of a ‘Decision’ as a legal act under Article 
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288(4) in the context of the conclusion of international agreements.86 Yet, in the judgment, 
the Court makes a more general point about the interpretation of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI 
Regulation. It rejects a restrictive interpretation of ‘legal acts’, thus clarifying that the 
Commission cannot reject a proposed Initiative on the basis that the Initiative does not 
propose final EU acts with legally binding effects vis-à-vis third parties.87 
In addition to expanding the definition of ‘legal acts’ in the ECI context, the judgment also 
clarified that citizens can utilise the ECI not only to ask for ‘positive action’ on behalf of the 
Commission, but also to ask for the partial or total repeal of legal acts. The Commission had 
argued that an Initiative proposing ‘negative action’ (e.g. the non-conclusion of an 
international agreement) contradicts the Commission’s powers under Article 10(1)(c) of the 
ECI Regulation to issue a Communication setting out the ‘action it intends to take, if any’. 
Based on this rather obscure argument, the Commission stated that a declaration on its behalf 
that, as a response to an ECI, it does not aim to propose the adoption of a legal act would 
have excessively limited the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiative.88  
Contrary to the Commission’s position, the General Court declared that a proposal for a legal 
act that implements the Treaties cannot be refused registration on the rationale that the 
proposal allegedly interferes with an ongoing legislative procedure or distracts the exercise of 
the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiative.89 In the case at hand, the act proposed 
by the Initiative aimed to prevent the conclusion of TTIP and CETA. These agreements 
would modify the EU legal order. A proposed legal act, such as the one in question, which 
seeks to prevent the modification of the EU legal order, contributes to the implementation of 
the Treaties, therefore fulfilling that part of the Article 4(2)(b) test.90  
Before the Stop TTIP case, the Commission had limited the scope of ECIs to proposals giving 
a stamp of approval to an international agreement, and proposals to repeal an existing 
agreement, the argument being that only these ‘positive’ legal acts could be considered to 
implement the Treaties. The judgment now opens the door to ECI proposals concerning 
international agreements that are being negotiated at the time of the proposal’s submission. It 
also opens the door to ECI proposals that object to the negotiations or the conclusion of those 
agreements. The significance of these possibilities, especially when it comes to the future use 
of the ECI to influence policy making at the EU level, is highlighted below. 
C. The possibility for registering ECIs in the field of international agreements 
The new developments in the ECI legal admissibility test have created the possibility for the 
instrument to be used in areas where this was not possible so far: the negotiation or the 
prevention of the conclusion of international (trade) agreements. The wide interpretation by 
the General Court of the notion of ‘legal acts for the purposes of implementing the Treaties’ 
                                                          
86
 Commission v Council, C-114/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2151. 
87
 See para 35: ‘The concept of “legal act” cannot be understood “as being limited only to definitive European 
Union legal acts which produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”.’ 
88
 Para 21. 
89
 Paras 44-45 
90
 Minority SafePack para 41. 
22 
 
establishes the use of an ECI as a mechanism allowing citizens’ participation and fostering a 
space for contention in areas where these elements traditionally lack a formalised outlet.91  
This extension – or, perhaps, the calibration – of the ECI’s legal scope to allow for the 
involvement of EU citizens in the conclusion of international agreements has come in good 
time: a time when citizens can have more insight than before into the negotiation process of 
such agreements. Some academics have argued that ‘the TTIP marks the start of a new 
approach to transparency in trade negotiations that is very much to be welcomed.’92 TTIP 
negotiations were accompanied by release of information to the European Parliament and the 
public, and were thought to signal ‘a new generation of trade agreements’93 characterised by 
an openness to debate, consultation, and the publication of EU’s positions.94 This is not to say 
that TTIP is absolutely transparent or that the field of international agreements or external 
relations will automatically become more open to citizens’ participation because of the 
increase in the transparency of the negotiations.95 Instead, it is to suggest that – at least in 
principle – this increased transparency in the process has the potential to enable citizens to 
participate more actively in the EU decision-making process. 
With regard to the actual ‘Stop TTIP’ ECI campaign, it appears that the Court’s judgment has 
had a limited impact. After the initial rejection by the Commission of their proposal in 2014, 
and while judicially challenging the Commission’s approach, the organisers started a ‘self-
organised ECI’, which attempted to collect signatures outside the ECI’s legal framework. The 
campaign eventually collected more than three million signatures, which the organisers 
handed over to the Commission in October 2015.96 Between 2014 and 2017, several 
developments took place regarding TTIP and CETA, including 15 negotiating rounds on 
TTIP up to October 2016, and a proposal in July 2016 by the Commission to the Council for 
the signature and conclusion of CETA.97 CETA was signed in October 201698, achieving the 
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exact opposite of what the Stop TTIP organisers were asking through their ECI. This 
sequence of events meant that one of the basic goals of the Initiative has become redundant.  
In 2017, the Commission reconsidered the 2014 proposal of the organisers, as a follow-up 
action to the annulment of its initial decision by the General Court.99 It registered the ECI 
only in so far as the campaign concerns the TTIP negotiations which are, in any case, 
currently frozen. The signature collection period for the ECI ended 10 July 2018, without any 
signs – online, at least, – that the campaign was actively collecting signatures.100 There are 
also no signs in the Commission’s Decision that it might accept the previously collected 3 
million signatures as fulfilling the signature quotas for the newly-registered Stop TTIP ECI. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the development of the ECI legal admissibility test on 
international agreements signed by the EU go beyond the specifics of the Stop TTIP ECI. In 
particular, the CJEU’s contribution may become relevant in the context of another, even more 
pertinent issue: Brexit. There have already been four proposed Initiatives linked with Brexit. 
Two of them were rejected by the Commission: ‘Stop Brexit’ and ‘British friends-stay with 
us in EU’. The others, namely ‘EU Citizenship for Europeans: United in Diversity in Spite of 
jus soli and jus sanguinis’, ‘Retaining European Citizenship’, and ‘European Free Movement 
Instrument’ did not manage to reach one million signatures.101 Of these registered ECIs, the 
former ECI suggested the prevention of the Brexit process altogether, while the other three 
proposed actions to safeguard citizens’ rights during the Brexit process. As such, these 
particular examples are not directly linked with acts for the conclusion of an international 
agreement (Article 207 and 218 TFEU), which were the bone of contention in the Stop TTIP 
case.102 They do illustrate, however, that some citizens have turned to the ECI as a means to 
try to influence the Brexit negotiations. 
It is not unlikely that, in the future, we might see attempts to influence, through an ECI, the 
future agreement on the UK- EU relationship. Inevitably, for now this argument is 
speculative and assumes that an agreement between the UK and the EU will be negotiated on 
the basis of Article 107 and 218 TFEU after the withdrawal of the UK from the European 
Union. 
Despite its speculative nature, it is worth entertaining for a moment the possibility of using an 
ECI in the upcoming Brexit negotiations and the way in which this can create a new 
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dimension to citizens’ participation and voice in the Brexit process at the EU level. First of 
all, it is notable that we have not seen something similar to a Citizens’ Initiative at the 
national level after the 23 June 2016 EU Referendum. Petitions sent to UK Parliament and a 
Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit, which took place in September 2017, might be considered 
participatory instruments along the same spirit as a citizens’ initiative but at the same time 
different from it.103 For instance, even if a petition gets to be debated before UK Parliament, 
the petitioners are not necessarily invited to the debate, while a Citizens’ Assembly was a 
one-off event that required the recruitment of citizens to participate in it. What is more, both 
of them take place at the national level instead of the EU level, and none of them are directly 
linked to EU citizenship in the way that the ECI is presented to be.104 Instead, the debate in 
the UK has largely centred around the democratic representation of citizens in the final Brexit 
agreement through their representatives in Parliament, or through a second referendum, rather 
than through other means of participation. 
A successful ECI attempting to influence the future UK-EU future relations by supporting or 
preventing a future agreement would also be a first in terms of citizens participating in the 
negotiations at the EU level. In the context of the current Brexit negotiations, the 
Commission has attempted to emphasise what it deems to be a ‘tailor-made approach to 
transparency’ that ensures ‘the maximum level of transparency during the whole negotiating 
process.’105 In addition to enhancing the transparency of the process, there seems to already 
be one element of public participation in the field of Brexit negotiations at the EU level, in 
the form of bilateral meetings between Directors-General and organisations of self-employed 
individuals, or stakeholders such as European associations who can contribute to the 
negotiations by presenting their take on the EU-wide impact of the UK withdrawal.106 The 
Commission’s Decision on the publication of information on these meetings refers to Article 
11(1) and (2) TEU, which requires EU institutions to give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of 
Union action, and to maintain an open, transparent, and regular dialogue with representative 
associations and civil society.107  
It is well known, however, that the top-down engagement with stakeholders by virtue of 
Articles 11(1) and 11(2) TEU is different in nature from the type of bottom-up participation 
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that is supposed to take place through an ECI.108 Articles 11(1) and (2) are seen as codifying 
previous practices by the Commission, which were highlighted in the 2001 White Paper on 
Governance and aim at involving a number of organised actors (e.g. representative 
associations and civil society organisations) in the EU decision-making process for the 
benefit of improving the policy outcome of that process.109 By way of contrast, the ECI was 
introduced as a bottom-up participation mechanism that aims at directly involving the citizen 
in the EU’s decision-making process. In this sense, the use of the ECI would indeed be an 
innovation for the Brexit negotiations. 
Beyond the theoretical advantages of using an ECI to influence the future course of Brexit, 
opening this door to EU citizens also raises some questions. Once again under the caveat that 
we may not even see an ECI attempting to influence the future UK-EU agreement, one can 
look ahead and wonder how appropriate or suitable it would be to allow citizens of the 
remaining 27 EU Member States to influence the Brexit negotiating process. Let us assume, 
for the sake of the argument and based on the current state of play on Brexit, that the UK has 
withdrawn from the EU, the transition agreement has expired on 31 December 2020, and the 
Commission has proposed the initiation of negotiations for the conclusion of an international 
agreement under Article 218 TFEU between the EU and the UK as a third country.110 On the 
basis of EU primary law (Article 11(4) TEU), an ECI can be brought by ‘not less than one 
million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States’. Furthermore, 
according to the current ECI Regulation, the signatories of an ECI shall come from seven EU 
Member States, while the organisers of an ECI ‘shall be citizens of the Union.’111  
This would lead us to the following – perhaps paradoxical – situation: In post-Brexit EU, a 
group of citizens from Member States other than the United Kingdom, could bring an 
Initiative supported by signatures from citizens from Member States other than the United 
Kingdom to influence a process that concerns the future relationship of the United Kingdom 
with the EU. Of course, one could make the same argument as the one above about any 
international (trade) agreement that concerns the EU and a third-country. Yet, the roots of 
Brexit in UK citizens’ sentiments of repatriating control and reclaiming sovereignty, as well 
as the attachment of sovereignty to nationhood, could be said to distinguish an ECI 
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concerning Brexit than an ECI concerning any other international agreement negotiated by 
the EU.112  
The extent to which British citizens can use an ECI to influence the Brexit process is a related 
issue. Yet, whether this is an actual possibility for the future depends primarily on when the 
ECI Regulation will cease to apply to the United Kingdom. It might be the case that the ECI 
Regulation will become inapplicable in the United Kingdom from even before the beginning 
of the transition period, i.e. from March 2019. It recently transpired that UK Parliament is 
currently unclear on this point. Although MPs were under the impression that the ECI 
Regulation will not apply to the UK during the transition period, the Minister for the 
Constitution has taken the position that the ECI Regulation will apply in the UK during the 
implementation period under the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill.113 The 
House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee is currently awaiting clarification by the 
Minister on this matter. It would seem that, if the MPs are correct on this matter, the 
possibility for British citizens to influence the Brexit process through an ECI is already 
curtailed, as any Initiative that is registered now will have less than twelve months to collect 
the necessary one million signatures. 
The discussion so far has analysed the most pertinent developments that have taken place to 
the ECI’s legal admissibility test since the inception of the mechanism in 2012, thus outlining 
the evolution of the test in the last six years. Changes to the interpretation and application of 
the test have resulted from the CJEU’s intervention (e.g. on the concept of ‘legal acts’) and 
the Commission’s own revised approach to the test (e.g. on partial registration). We have also 
discussed some of the consequences in practice of the evolution of the ECI legal admissibility 
test, touching upon the question of whether the changes are able to transform the ECI to a 
more extensive and more effective instrument of public participation, or whether they are 
merely creating the misleading impression that the ECI was given fresh life. The subsequent 
section further engages with this question by evaluating some of the limitations to the 
developments discussed so far.   
V. THE NEED TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION 
In Stop TTIP, the General Court linked the interpretation of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI 
Regulation not only with the principles of conferral or institutional balance, but also with ‘the 
principle of democracy’ and the ECI’s objective of ‘improving the democratic functioning of 
the European Union by granting every citizen a general right to participate in democratic 
life’.114 Throughout the judgment, the General Court relied extensively on the nature of the 
ECI as a democratic participation mechanism that intends to foster democratic dialogue and 
allow citizens to address the Commission. This is visible in the fact that the Court interpreted 
the notions of ‘legal acts’ and that of ‘implementing the Treaties’ not only on a joint reading 
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of Article 11(4) TEU and the relevant provisions of the ECI Regulation, but also by referring 
to the fundamental principle of democracy as included in the Preamble to the Treaty and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights when expanding the Commission’s initial – and rather 
more limited – delineation of the ECI’s legal scope.115  
Using as a starting point the Court’s view of the ECI as a means of granting EU citizens the 
right to participate in EU’s democratic life, we should take a pause here to consider the above 
Brexit scenario, as well as the rest of the developments to the ECI’s legal admissibility test, in 
light of the limitations of the mechanism, and particularly the limitations to the success of 
getting an Initiative acted on by the EU institutions at the end of the signature collection 
process. 
Arguments relating to the ability – or inability – of the ECI to influence the EU law-making 
process116 mandate a nuanced response both to the possibility of using the ECI to influence 
International Agreements – including in the context of Brexit – and to the positive effects of 
the evolution of the legal admissibility test more broadly speaking. The issue of an ECI’s 
follow-up stage has become, by now, the ‘elephant in the room’ when it comes to discussing 
the ECI as a participatory instrument. Even if an ECI manages to register without any 
problems, and completes a very successful signature collection campaign, at the end of the 
day the question is how will the EU institutions, and primarily the Commission, respond to 
the proposals of the organisers.  
Take here as an example the Ban Glyphosate ECI, which was registered in January 2017, and 
managed to reach the necessary signatures within approximately five months.117 The ECI 
called for the Commission to take three actions: to propose to Member States a ban on 
glyphosate, to reform the pesticide approval procedure, and to set EU-wide mandatory 
reduction targets for pesticide use. It was registered by the Commission in January 2017, and 
submitted its 1,070,865 statements of support, collected from 22 Member States, in October 
2017. Its public hearing took place in November 2017 and the Commission submitted its final 
Communication one month later.118 Meanwhile, the Commission had already submitted to the 
Member States a draft Implementing Regulation for the renewal of the approval of 
glyphosate for five years. The Regulation was approved by a qualified majority of Member 
States and was adopted in December 2017.119 In its response to the ECI, the Commission 
expressed its plans to support the second and third aim of the ECI. However, it also stated 
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that, based on the available information and a favourable scientific assessment on glyphosate 
by the European Food Safety Authority, it had ‘no basis to submit to the co-legislators a 
proposal to ban glyphosate’, essentially dismissing the main objective of the ECI. This is 
despite a non-binding Resolution adopted by the European Parliament in 2017, which called 
for a glyphosate phase-out by 2022.120 
Considerations regarding the follow-up of an ECI should also qualify the possibility of 
Initiative organisers using Article 352 TFEU as the legal basis for their proposed Initiative. It 
is not often when a legal act will be proposed on the lex generalis of Article 352 TFEU 
instead of a lex specialis, especially after the Treaty of Lisbon.121 What is more, in the 
(nowadays) rare occasion where the Commission might, indeed, propose a legal act to the 
Council, the text of Article 352 TFEU requires both a unanimous adoption of the legal act by 
the Council, and the consent of the European Parliament. Both of these hurdles make the 
eventual follow-up of an ECI based on Article 352 TFEU questionable.122  
Having said that, it should also be noted that the legal admissibility test and the follow-up 
stage are, formally speaking, two different steps in the whole ECI procedure, the former 
taking place at the very beginning and the latter at the very end. The example of the judgment 
on Article 352 TFEU shows that the CJEU also makes this distinction. As we have seen, the 
CJEU allowed the use of Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis despite the improbability of it 
actually leading to a successful legislative proposal in practice. This example emphasises 
that, in the CJEU’s judgments, considerations about the follow-up stage did not affect 
considerations about the legal admissibility test. 
What is more, the distinction between the legal admissibility test and the follow-up test was 
recently highlighted both in the above-mentioned case of Stop TTIP and in One of Us, which 
is the first ever judgment concerning the Commission’s duties at the follow-up stage of the 
ECI (Article 10(1)(c) of the ECI Regulation). When taken together, the two judgments paint a 
picture of the ECI as an instrument that exists in line with the principle of institutional 
balance by allowing the Commission to have the last word on the legal and political 
conclusions on the ECI, thus preserving the institution’s monopoly of legislative initiative.  
For instance, after defending the participatory democratic character of the ECI in the Stop 
TTIP case, the General Court landed the applicants and the readers of the judgment back to 
reality by explaining that, even if the Commission proposes the acts of the ECI to the Council 
and the Council adopts them, there is nothing preventing the EU institutions from 
subsequently negotiating and concluding new transatlantic free-trade agreements.123 More 
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explicitly, in the case of One of Us, the General Court clarified that the Commission is not 
required to submit a proposal for a legal act following an ECI. What happens at the ECI’s 
registration stage does not bind the Commission as to its approach at the follow-up stage.124 
The Commission’s decision of whether or not to register an ECI involves only a first 
assessment of the legal aspect of the proposal and ‘is without prejudice to the Commission’s 
assessment in the context of the communication adopted on the basis of Article 10(1)(c)’.125 
The implications of the distinction described here are seen in the actual One of Us judgment 
itself, where the General Court refrained from reviewing to any great length the 
Commission’s final decision not to act on the proposals of the One of Us. Although the 
General Court examined in quite some detail whether the Commission fulfilled its 
(procedural) duty to give reasons, it only conducted a limited review of the applicant’s 
argument that the Commission’s assessment of the ECI was mistaken. Since the Commission 
has broad discretion in exercising its powers of legislative initiative, the final decision of the 
Commission regarding a successful ECI can only be reviewed by the CJEU to identify any 
manifest errors of assessment behind the decision.126  In light of the CJEU’s approach, 
organisers who wish to contend the Commission’s final decision on their successful ECI 
should bear in mind the inherent limitations that they will face if they follow the judicial 
avenue for this purpose. 
Yet, one might ask whether recent procedural changes in the Commission’s approach to the 
ECI registration stage might blur the line between deciding on legal admissibility of ECIs and 
deciding on their follow-up. We have argued above that, in principle, the legal admissibility 
test has become more flexible than in previous years. We have also identified a practical 
change in the attitude of the Commission in that it is now publishing its decisions to register 
proposed Initiatives.127 The more elaborate explanations of the Commission’s decisions at the 
legal admissibility stage should provide a clearer picture to ECI organisers and stakeholders 
as to the Commission’s position and the reasons behind the registration or rejection of each 
submitted Initiative. Despite its positive elements, however, the Commission’s change in 
attitude bears the question whether the Commission’s initial explanation of its own views on 
an Initiative may constrict the organisers’ proposals at the end of a process by not allowing 
them to further develop their understanding of their proposals. After all, as we have seen, the 
ECI legal admissibility test should only be a preliminary test that leaves a full legal 
assessment for the end of the signature collection process.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The article has highlighted some of the positive current, but also potential, outcomes of the 
new developments in the context of the ECI’s legal admissibility test and has illustrated some 
of the limitations to these developments. It has provided an updated view of the ECI’s legal 
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admissibility test in light of the CJEU’s ECI-jurisprudence, and the Commission’s past and 
current approach to the registration stage. Before concluding, it is worth explaining why the 
exercise of keeping track of, and evaluating the developments to, the ECI legal admissibility 
test is pertinent and timely.  
Firstly, the reconsideration of the ECI legal admissibility test comes in good time. Legal 
challenges to the Commission’s approach in the context of rejected Initiatives have given the 
CJEU the opportunity to clarify the existing legal framework viz. the registration stage, and 
more specifically Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. In turn, the body of case law that 
arises from the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the ECI has given us the opportunity to consider 
whether, and how, the ECI legal admissibility has developed since 2012.  
Secondly, an analysis of the ECI legal admissibility test remains as relevant to the overall 
assessment of the ECI as it was when the ECI Regulation first came to life. To put it simply, 
the stricter the interpretation of Article 4(2)(b), the more limited the scope of the ECI will be, 
and the less the variety of acts that citizens will be able to propose. It holds true that the 
impact of the ECI legal admissibility test on the registration of Initiatives should not be 
exaggerated: the application of the test so far has not stopped the ECI from being used. 
Although the number of ECIs has decreased since the first three years of the ECI 
Regulation’s application, there is no proof that the legal admissibility test should be solely 
blamed for this decrease.128 However, it is also true that the Commission’s role as a 
‘doorstopper’ at the registration stage of an Initiative is directly linked to the use of the ECI 
as a novel, democratic method for citizens to propose legislative or policy measures to the 
Commission and potentially to the EU legislators.  
The pertinence of the ECI legal admissibility test in the ECI’s functioning was also 
highlighted by the CJEU in the cases discussed in this contribution, albeit with some nuances 
among the judgments. For instance, the General Court in Anagnostakis and Constantini 
considered the legal admissibility test against an understanding of the ECI as a right attached 
to EU citizenship. According to the Court, the ECI expresses ‘a right of Union citizens to 
submit a citizens’ initiative’, which is enshrined in Article 24(1) TFEU. A refusal to register a 
proposed Initiative is, therefore, an action that may ‘impinge upon the very effectiveness’ of 
the said right.129  
The General Court also relied on the notion of democracy when interpreting the legal 
admissibility conditions, in the case of Stop TTIP. More explicitly, the Court stated that the 
aim of the ECI is ‘to allow EU citizens to participate more in the democratic life of the 
European Union’, in particular by presenting the ECI to the Commission and, during the 
public hearing to the Parliament, and requesting the Commission to submit a proposal for a 
legal act, stimulating simultaneously a democratic debate.130 The ECJ was less enthusiastic in 
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using the terminology of ‘a right to submit a citizens’ initiative’. Instead, in the judgment on 
appeal of Anagnostakis, it presented the ECI as: 
‘an instrument concerning the right of citizens to participate in the democratic life of 
the Union, provided for in Article 10(3) TEU, in that it allows them to apply directly 
to the Commission in order to submit to it a request inviting it to submit a proposal 
for a legal act of the Union, for the purposes of the application of the Treaties’131 
and explained that Article 4(2)(b) is a precondition for citizens to do so. This is not the place 
to delve into whether the Treaties bestow a right to citizens through an ECI, or what the 
limitations of that right are. For our purposes, it suffices to say that the ECI-judgments 
confirm our understanding of the ECI legal admissibility test as a first port of call for 
Initiative organisers affecting the way in which – and the extent to which – EU citizens can 
take advantage of the ECI mechanism to suggest legislative or policy measures at the EU 
level. 
This article has argued that the interpretation and application of the ECI legal admissibility 
test has evolved since 2012. This evolution has taken place primarily in two ways. On the one 
hand, certain contested procedural aspects of the ECI’s legal admissibility test have been 
resolved, opening new doors for the use of the ECI, such as the potential to partially register 
an Initiative. On the other hand, the scope of the ECI has been extended. Citizens are now 
able to propose Initiatives objecting to the conclusion of an international agreement that is 
being negotiated by the EU, which was not the case before the CJEU’s judgment in Stop 
TTIP. The analysis has illustrated the impact of the CJEU on the development of the test, by 
illustrating the way in which the CJEU filled certain gaps in our understanding of the ECI’s 
legal admissibility test. 
Finally, in anticipation of future ECIs on the expanded scope of the ECI vis-à-vis 
international agreements, this contribution reflected on the possibility of using the ECI to 
influence the post-Brexit agreement on the future relations between the UK and the EU. It 
was highlighted that anyone who considers bringing an ECI from this newly-opened gate 
should proceed with caution: the classic limitations to the follow-up stage of an ECI still 
exist, and there is a risk that the New ECI Regulation, if passed without amendments, might 
further complicate the process for registration. Ultimately, while acknowledging the positive 
contributions of the recent developments to the ECI’s legal admissibility stage, the 
contribution expresses nuanced expectations of how these developments may play out in 
practice.  
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